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ACCOUNTANTS AND THE COMMON LAW: LIABILITY
TO THIRD PARTIES
Michael A. Mess*
[An accountant] is a watch-dog but not a blood hound.
In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co. [1896] 2 Ch. Div. 279, 288.
I. Introduction
The consumer movement has given new impetus to the assault on the citadel
of privity which had long protected the professions, particularly accounting.'
Long secure from liability for negligence to non-client third parties, the account-
ing profession is becoming more anxious and concerned as this traditional pro-
tection crumbles.
The question of accountants' third party liability is a difficult one, since
accounting services often benefit the public as well as a particular client. Present
limitations upon the liability of the accountant to non-client third parties are
derived from two general sources: the securities laws and common law. The
securities laws are playing an increasing role in defining the scope and nature of
accountants' legal duties and liabilities.2 However, while the influence of the
securities laws is inescapable, the focus of this article will be to trace the develop-
ment of the common law liability of accountants to third parties not in privity of
contract with them.
Common law liability has developed along two lines: (1) fraud and deceit,
and (2) negligence. The cornerstone for the development of both branches in
America was the landmark decision by the New York Court of Appeals in Ultra-
mares Corporation v. Touche.' Although the decision still reflects the majority
view, its rationale faces serious challenge today.
In tracing the development of the common law liability of accountants to
non-client third parties, this article will critically examine the underlying policy
of Ultramares and will discuss the probable future course of accountants' third
party liability.
II. Historical Development of the Accountant's Role
Three important historical events and trends have contributed significantly
to the development of the professional responsibility of the accountant in the
* B.A., Purdue University, 1973; J.D., George Washington University 1976; associate,
Spencer, Whalen & Graham, Washington, D.C.
1 "Professions once seemingly inviolate from litigation are no longer sacrosanct. The age-
old axiom that physicians bury their mistakes, while attorneys and accountants file theirs away,
has little relevance in modern-day America." Eizenstat & Speer, Accountants' Professional
Liability: Expanding Exposure, 22 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 7 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
3 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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American economic and business system.' These are: (1) the beginning of the
modem capitalistic system at the turn of the twentieth century; (2) the enact-
ment of federal securities legislation intended to implement a policy of full dis-
closure; and (3) the rise of public ownership of the American corporation. Dur-
ing each of these stages, new duties and responsibilities were imposed on the
accountant which, in many respects, were not matched by a concomitant increase
in legal liability.
Initially, business entities were either owned by an individual or by a small
number of people and had little need for outside capital. Since the owner was
both manager and investor, the accountant had only to provide an adequate
report to guide the owner's decision-making. He performed a bookkeeping func-
tion. However, as the modern corporation began to emerge, the need for outside
capital investment increased. "Accountants now had a consumer for their
reports beyond their direct client. Further, the new consumer was likely not to
be so well informed nor so sophisticated on the financial matters being reported
on as was the direct client."5
As ownership of the corporation began to diversify, lenders and investors
became more dependent upon management reports prepared by the accountant.
Yet the report was still primarily considered a tool for the management, although
it was being used to obtain credit and entice investors.
The stock market crash of 1929 evoked severe criticism of existing account-
ing practices. These practices contributed in part to the passage of the federal
securities laws in 1933 and 1934. Accountants were given central responsibility
in the task of implementing the mandate of the securities laws-full disclosure of
corporate affairs to the public.
Congress chose to protect the public by requiring full disclosure of relevant
information in the issue of securities rather than the passage on the quality
of the security. The main thrust of the federal legislation was expressed by
its sponsors as being to "place the owners of securities on a parity, so far as
possible, with the management of the corporations, and to place the buyer
on the same plane so far as available information is concerned, with the
seller." 6
The accountant thus assumed a duty to the public investor as well as to the
management of a corporation.
The growth of large public investment and diversification of corporate
ownership marked the latest significant development of the accounting profession.
The new small public investor, however, did not possess financial sophistication
and could not be expected to develop it. The full disclosure policy of the securities
law thus was intended to benefit the buying public which relied on accounting
reports to guide its investment decision making. Accountants' reports therefore
4 Causey, Duties and Liabilities of the CPA, in EVOLUTION OF AUDIT RESPONSIBILITY
11-27 (1973).
5 Wyatt, Auditors' Responsibilities, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331, 333 (1968).
6 Marinelli, Jr., The Expanding Scope of Accountants' Liability to Third Parties, 23
CASE W. REs. L. RFv. 113, 126-27 (1971).
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began to be used not only by management and the foreseen investor or lender,
but also by unknown third party investors.'
The central premise of the traditional common law liability as defined in
Ultramares-that the accountants' report is primarily for the benefit of the
management-has been increasingly challenged with the growth of public owner-
ship of stock and the rise of the consumer movement. However, the primary
obstacle to increasing accountants' liability has been the strong policy against
allowing recovery by third parties not in privity for economic losses which are
not accompanied by physical injury and harm.
III. The Privity Doctrine of Contracts
The privity doctrine, the major hurdle against establishing liability to third
parties, was established in 1842 by a leading English case, Winterbottom v.
Wright.8 There the court denied recovery to a passenger on a stagecoach who
was injured when a defectively manufactured part caused the coach to overturn.
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff
can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who
was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action.
Unless we confine the operations of such contracts as this to the parties who
entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which
I can see no limit, would ensue
Although this case dealt only with a plaintiff's ability to bring an action on the
contract, the language may be interpreted to preclude any suit, even in tort, for
negligent performance of a contract which results in the injury of a third party
not in privity.
Even as the privity doctrine was becoming firmly entrenched, a basis for
its abrogation was established in Thomas v. Winchester." There the court held
that the vendor was liable to a third party injured by the negligent mislabeling
of a toxic drug. Liability was based on the policy that the negligence placed a
human life in imminent danger and thus privity of contract should not be a
bar to a suit.
A major break from the privity doctrine in the area of manufacturer's
product liability occurred in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." Judge Cardozo
in this decision repudiated the privity doctrine when the negligence of the manu-
facturer resulted in physical harm either to the person or to the property of a
third party.
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature
7 "The responsibility of a public accountant is not only to the client who pays this fee,
but also to investors, creditors and others who may rely on the financial statements which he
certifies." Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 SEC 629, 670 (1957) (emphasis added).
8 [1842] 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402.
9 Id. at 405.
10 6 N.Y. 397, 58 Am. Dec. 455 '(1852).
11 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger
there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than
the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract,
the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.
... We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and
limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of
contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where
it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.'
2
Inroads into the privity doctrine generally centered on injuries to third
parties resulting in tangible physical harm to person or to property. Mere eco-
nomic loss was not considered sufficient to require the rejection of the privity
doctrine. In a leading English case, Derry v. Peck," the court held that there was
no liability to a third party not in privity for negligent misrepresentation which
results only in a pecuniary loss. However, the court also pointed out that lack
of privity was not a valid defense to a claim of fraud, and that in order to main-
tain an action for deceit an intentional misrepresentation had to be proved. Also,
a false statement made negligently and carelessly, without a reasonable belief in
it, could be evidence of fraud. Lord Hershell summarized as follows:
First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of
fraud, and nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when
it is shown that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2)
without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, carelessly whether it be true or
false. Although I have treated the second and third as distinct cases, I think
the third is but an instance of the second, for one who makes a statement
under such circumstances can have no real belief in the truth of what he
states. To prevent a false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think
always be an honest belief in its truth. And this probably covers the whole
ground, for one who knowingly alleges that which is false. Thirdly, if fraud
be proved, the motive of the person guilty is immaterial. It matters not
that there was no intention to cheat or injure the person to whom the
statement was made.1
4
The first imposition of liability to a third party not in privity, where only
intangible economic interests were involved, was in Glanzer v. Shepard."- The
court held a public weigher, contracted by the seller, liable to a buyer who over-
paid when the. weights were negligently overstated.
We think the law imposes a duty toward buyer as well as seller in the
situation here disclosed. The plaintiffs' use of the certificates was not -an
indirect or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers. It was a
consequence which, to the weighers' knowledge, was the end and aim of the
transaction ... The defendants held themselves out to the public as skilled
and careful in their calling. They knew that beans had been sold, and that
on the faith of their certificate payment would be made. They sent a copy
to the plaintiffs for the very purpose of inducing action... In such circum-
stances, assumption of the task of weighing was the assumption of the duty
12 Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1053.
13 [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337.
14 Id. at 374.
15 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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to weigh carefully for the benefit of all whose conduct was to be governed.
We do not need to state the duty in terms of contract or of privity. Growing
out of a contract, it has nonetheless an origin not exclusively contractual.
Given the contract and the relation, the duty is imposed by law. Cf. Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co.
1 6
Prior to the landmark decision on accountants' liability in Ultramares, com-
mon law liability to third parties was limited. Privity of contract was neither a
defense to an action for deceit or fraud,17 nor a defense when the negligence
caused tangible physical harm to person or to property." When the third party
was the primary beneficiary of the transaction, 9 or the contract was a third
party beneficiary contract,20 privity of contract was not a defense even though
only intangible economic interest was involved. Upon this precedent, the deci-
sion which still forms the majority view on accountants' liability to non-client
third parties both for fraud and negligence was decided.
IV. The Cornerstone of Accountants' Liability:
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche"
Ultramares still stands as the landmark case in defining the scope of account-
ants' liability to third parties under the common law. Even cases which have
begun to question the underlying rationale of that decision have avoided over-
turning it. Instead, they usually distinguish it by relying on Glanzer v. Shepard.2
In Ultramares, the defendants were a firm of certified public accountants
which had audited the financial books of Fred Stern & Co., Inc. The accountants
provided the company with thirty-two copies of the certified balance sheet. The
firm had no knowledge of any actual future creditors, but knew in a general way
that the certified copies would be exhibited to banks and other creditors in order
to obtain future loans. The balance sheet exhibited a net worth of $1,010,000,
while in fact the corporation was insolvent due to the overevaluation of the
assets through the use of fictitious and non-existent accounts receivable. The
plaintiff, a factor, having lent money to the company in reliance upon the certi-
fied balance sheet, brought suit against the accounting firm after the company
filed for bankruptcy. The original complaint alleged only negligence, but a
second count for fraud was added at trial.
The trial court dismissed the fraud count and, on behalf of the defendants,
granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the negligence
count. The appellate division affirmed the fraud count dismissal, but reinstated
the jury verdict on the negligence count. The court of appeals, speaking through
Chief Judge Cardozo, reversed the appellate division. The court upheld the
trial court's granting of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the negli-
gence count, but reversed the fraud count dismissal and remanded it for a new
trial.
16 Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275-76.
17 See note 13, supra and accompanying text.
18 See note 11, supra and accompanying text.
19 See note 15, supra and accompanying text.
20 Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
21 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
22 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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The court of appeals perceived the role of the accountant in a narrow
sense. Although classified as public accountants, they "are public only in the
sense that their services are offered to anyone who chooses to employ them."23
The court admitted that negligent performance of accounting services had
been adequately shown, but held that it was a policy determination as to whether
the accountants owed a duty to the plaintiff:
To creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited the certifi-
cate, the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there
was notice in the circumstances of its making that the employer did not
intend to keep it to himself.
A different question develops when we ask whether they owed a
duty to these to make it without negligence. If liability for negligence exists,
a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath
the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.
The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to
enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of duty that
exposes to these consequences. 24
The holding in Glanzer was recognized, but the court carefully distinguished
it.
Here was something more than the rendition of a service in expectation that
the one who ordered the certificate would use it thereafter in the operations
of his business as occasion might require. Here was a case where the trans-
mission of the certificate to another was not merely one possibility among
many, but the "end and aim of the transaction...."
... In a word, the service rendered by defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard
was primarily for the. information of a third person, in effect, if not in name,
a party to the contract, and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee.
In the case at hand, the service was primarily for the benefit of the Stem
Company .. . and only incidentally or collaterally for the use of those to
whom Stem and his associates might exhibit it thereafter.25
The distinction made between Glanzer and Ultramares is highly artificial.
The client directly and financially benefits from the use of the certificates when
creditors and investors rely on them, much as the seller benefits from the use of
the public weigher's certificate in determining the price of the goods. Often a
creditor requires the financial report of the corporation before deciding to pro-
vide any loans, so that a report prepared for the corporation is almost assuredly
to be used and relied upon by future creditors. Also, as in Glanzer, the harm
which befell the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable risk, which the accounting
firm could be expected to have foreseen would be the result of a negligently pre-
pared report.
The main reason for creating the distinction seemed to rest on a policy
determination that all the imposed or assumed risk in a profession should be
reasonably calculated. Unlike Glanzer, where only one identified party was in-
23 255 N.Y. at 176, 174- N.E. at 448.
24 Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
25 Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
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volved, Ultramares involved the danger of limitless liability to foreseen but un-
identified parties. The court perceived this danger as too great a burden with
which to shackle the accounting profession.
In distinguishing Glanzer, the court left open the possibility of liability for
accountants to an identified third party who is the end and aim of the trans-
action. The subsequent development of the policy of Ultramares has ignored
this distinction; instead, accountants have been virtually immune from liability
for negligence to a third party not in privity. Only as recent cases begin to ques-
tion the rationale of Ultramares has this distinction been revitalized and used as
the basis for holding accountants liable without directly overruling Ultramares.
While Ultramares is primarily recognized for defining the scope of account-
ants' liability for negligence to third parties, it also defined the scope of their
liability for fraud to third parties:
Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences
of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as tojustify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy, for this
again is fraud. . . . The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own
knowledge, that the balance sheet was in accordance with the books of
account. If their statement was false, they are not to be exonerated because
they believed it to be true .... In this connection we are to bear in mind
the principle already stated that in the course of this opinion that negligence
or blindness, even when not equivalent to fraud, is nonetheless evidence to
sustain an inference of fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is gross. 26
The court in effect adopted the standard for fraudulent misrepresentation
established in Derry v. Peck.2 ' A plaintiff could recover for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation regardless of either the lack of intent of the defendant to induce reliance
on the misrepresentation or the lack of privity even when only an economic loss
was involved. Liability for deceit was extended to any member of an indeter-
minable class whose reliance on the accountant's report was reasonably foresee-
able. The reason for the different standard for an intentional and a negligent
wrongdoer, when only economic loss was involved, was the strong policy that
an innocent party should not suffer at the hands of an intentional wrongdoer.
The more lenient standard of proof for deceit-not requiring an intention
to induce reliance-was necessary in order to provide some remedy to the injured
party. Under the negligence standard, the plaintiff could recover only if it was
the primary beneficiary of the transaction.
Ultramares also concluded that the accountant's report was only collaterally
for use of others. Thus the proof necessary to prove either fraud or negligence
would be similar. The court refused to expand the duty of the accountant for
negligence because "[t]he extention, if made, [would] so expand the field of
liability for [negligence] as to make it nearly, if not quite, coterminous with that
of liability for fraud."' 8 Maintaining a rigid standard of proof for fraud would
make it coterminous with negligence and effectively exclude any chance of re-
26 Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448-49.
27 [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337.
28 255 N.Y. at 176, 174 N.E. at 447.
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covery for the injured plaintiff, even though privity of contract is not a valid
defense in a fraud case. Thus, to provide the basis for a claim by a third party
injured as a result of an accountant's negligence, an action for deceit could be
maintained which would not require proof of intent to induce reliance by the
third party.
In summary, Ultramares held: (1) an accountant would be liable to a
third party not in privity for negligence if the party was actually foreseen and
was the end and aim of the transaction; (2) an accountant would be liable to a
third party not in privity for deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation, without
proof of intent to induce reliance, if the reliance was reasonably foreseeable; and
(3) gross negligence which is not equivalent to fraud would nonetheless be
evidence to sustain an inference of fraud.
V. Case Development of Liability for Fraud
The first case to interpret Ultramares was O'Connor v. Ludlam,29 decided
by the Second Circuit. The court ignored the third party as a primary beneficiary
distinction drawn by Cardozo in Ultramares.
Since there was no contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and
the defendants liability could be imposed only for fraud, a mistake in the
balance sheet, even if it were the result of negligence could not be the basis
of a recovery. Ultramares Corp. .v. Touche.'0
The court also stated some guidelines for finding fraud and holding the account-
ant liable to the third party on that basis:
Fraud may be established by showing a false representation has been
made either knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or in reckless disregard
of whether it be true or false... If they did have that honest belief, whether
reasonably or unreasonably, they are not liable. If they did not have an
honest belief in the truth, of their statements, they are liable... Further,
if the audit made was so superficial as to be only a pretended audit and not
a real audit, then the element of knowledge of falsity of their representation
is present, and they may be held liable.31
In State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst," the New York Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the issue of what degree of negligence may constitute an inference of
fraud to support a finding of liability against the accountaftts. The court held
that gross negligence was sufficient to support a finding of fraud. Unlike Ultra-
mares, where the accountants had failed to check the fictitious accounts receiv-
able, here the accountants had failed to recognize the obvious overstating of the
accounts receivable due to the large amount of uncollectable accounts. The court
held that if this error in judgment was proven by the plaintiffs, then the account-
ants would be liable for fraud.
29 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937).
30 Id. at 54.
31 Id. at 54-55.
32 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Accountants, however, may be liable to third parties even where there
is lacking deliberate or actual fraud. A representation certified as true to the
knowledge of the accountants where knowledge there is none, a reckless
misstatement, or an opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the
conclusion that there was no genuine belief in its truth are all sufficient upon
which to base-liability. A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate
the doubtful, if sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an infer-
ence of fraud so as to impose liability for those losses suffered by those who
rely on the balance sheet.3 3
While expanding liability for fraud to gross negligence, which could include
errors of judgment, the court further emasculated the primary beneficiary rule
of Ultramares: "[I]n the absence of contractual relationship . . . accountants
can not be held liable for ordinary negligence in preparing a certified balance
sheet even though they are aware that the balance sheet will be used to obtain
credit."34
While State Street Trust further closed the door on holding accountants
liable for negligence, it did raise the possibility that some type of judgment errors,
when sufficiently gross, could tender the accountant liable for fraud. The line
between ordinary and gross negligence becomes the difference between finding
the accountant liable or not. This line cannot be clearly and finely drawn; thus
only after the effects of an act are developed by subsequent events can it be
determined whether or not the act was grossly negligent in order to find liability.
After State Street Trust the standard of fraud no longer depended on the scope
of duty owed to the third party, but rather on the standard of gross negligence.
Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen3" expanded the rationale of State Street
Trust to make gross negligence a separate cause of action in itself, rather than
merely an inference of fraud. "In order for Schwartz to recover damages, it
would be necessary for the Court to find that Cogen was guilty of gross negligence
rather than mere faulty judgment... Cogen's heedlessness and wanton disregard
of the consequences of his incorrect financial statement takes the place of delib-
erate intention to defraud.""aa
In this case the plaintiff was clearly the primary beneficiary of the account-
ant's report, since the accountant was specifically preparing the report for the
purpose of determining the purchase price of the company's stock. The court
ignored Glanzer and held that there was no privity of contract to sustain an
action for negligence. Instead the court determined that the accountant was
grossly negligent and liable to the plaintiff who was not in privity.
In C.I.T. Financial Corporation v. Glover,"1 the Second Circuit exonerated
the accountants since the plaintiffs failed to prove that the representations were
false or misleading in any material respect. But the decision did approve of jury
instructions which appeared to rest on the assumption that gross negligence alone
was sufficient to find liability against the accountants. This case represents the
33 Id. at 106-07, 15 N.E.2d 418-19.
34 Id. at 106, 15 N.E.2d 418.
35 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
36 Id. at 25.
37 244 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955).
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majority view concerning the scope of accountants' liability to third parties for
gross negligence. Besides fraud, gross negligence then is itself a sufficient ground
to find the accountant liable -to the third party. No longer is the accountant
assured that a "mere thoughtless slip or blunder" will not result in liability.
A new wrinkle on the action for deceit was presented in Fischer v. Kletz.'
The district court, in denying the accountant's motion to dismiss, implied that
accountants may be liable to third parties for deceit by failing to disclose after-
acquired information to investors who had previously relied on the certified finan-
cial statements which made the original reports misleading or false. Unlike most
deceit actions which involve affirmative misrepresentation by the defendants,
the theory of liability here was that the accountant's nondisclosure and silence
created a misrepresentation, since the after-acquired information made the
original statements misleading. The accountants had an affirmative duty to
make the disclosures.
Liability in a case of nondisclosure is based upon the breach of duty
imposed by the demands of 'good faith and and common honesty.' Loewer
v. Harris, 57 F. at 373. The imposition of the duty creates an objective
standard against which to measure a defendant's action and leaves no room
for an analysis of the subjective consideration inherent in the area of
intent... [I]t can be persuasively urged that in a nondisclosure case, intent
can be sensibly imputed to a defendant who, knowing that plaintiff will
rely on his original representation, sits by silently when they tur out to be
false.
. . . The common law has long required that a person who has made
a representation must correct that representation if it becomes false and if
he knows people are relying on it. This duty to disclose is imposed regard-
less of the interest of the defendant in the representation and subsequent
nondisclosure. 39
The court, in imposing a duty of "good faith and common honesty" upon
the accountant, treated him as a separate and distinct party to the business trans-
action of preparing the financial statements for a publicly-owned company.
Unlike Ultramares, where the subsequent use of the accountant's report was
considered to be of collateral importance, the court in Kletz held the accountant
had an independent and direct responsibility to the investing public which would
rely upon financial reports prepared by him. Since the action was a deceit claim,
the issue of privity was irrelevant. But the reasoning of the court substantially
questioned the underlying rationale of Ultramares that lack of privity of contract
is a valid defense to a claim for negligence by a party which used the accountant's
report collaterally. While this case broadens the scope of accountants' liability
to third parties, by imposing a duty to disclose after-acquired information which
reveals the falsity of previously made reports, it also offered a starting point for a
reexamination of the policy underlying the decision in Ultramares.
In summary, the present status of common law liability of an accountant
for fraud is that gross negligence is sufficient to hold the accountant liable for
38 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
39 Id. at 188.
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fraud,"0 and that the failure to disclose after-acquired information which makes
the first report false, when it is known that third parties are relying on the original
report, can make the accountant liable for fraud.4
VI. Case Development of Liability for Negligence
Landell v. Lybrand" was the first American case to define the scope of
liability of accountants to third parties for negligence. The decision was con-
sistent with traditional common law which denied liability to third parties when
only economic loss was involved and no privity was present.
[T]here was no contractual relation between the plaintiff and defen-
dants, and, if there is any liability from them to him, it must arise out of
some breach of duty, for there is no averment that they made the report
with intent to deceive him. The averment in the statement of claim is that
the defendants were careless and negligent in making their report; but the
plaintiff was a stranger to them and to it, and, as no duty rested upon them
to him, they can not be guilty of any negligence of which he can complain. 43
This reflects the same view that was taken in Ultramares; unless a duty is
owed to the third party to provide a report without negligence, then no liability
for negligence will exist. Glanzer v. Shepard," a case dealing with public
weighers rather than accountants, developed the primary beneficiary rule to allow
recovery for economic loss even when privity of contract did not exist. There
the court, finding that a duty existed to the third party who was the primary
beneficiary of the contract, held that the defendant was liable for negligence.
We state the defendants' obligation, therefore in terms, not of contract
merely, but of duty . . . We may see here, if we please, a phase or extension
of the rule in Lawrence v. Fox. If we fix our gaze upon that aspect, we shall
stress the element of contract, and treat the defendants' promise as embrac-
ing the rendition of a service, which, though ordered and paid for by one,
was either wholly or in part for the benefit of another... The defendants,
acting, not casually nor as mere servants, but in the pursuit of an indepen-
dent calling weighed and certified at the order of one with the very end and
aim of shaping the conduct of another. Diligence was owing, not only to
him who ordered, but to him also who relied.4 5
Ultramares, as earlier noted," distinguished Glanzer and held the account-
ant had no duty to third parties who relied on the prepared reports when the
accountant had only general knowledge of the expected users of the certified
balance sheets. Ultramares was interpreted subsequently to exempt the account-
ant almost totally from liability for negligence to third parties.
40 See note 35, supra and accompanying text.
41 See note 38, supra and accompanying text.
42 264 Pa. 406, 197 A. 783 (1919).
43 Id.
44 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
45 Id. at 241, 135 N.E. at 277.
46 See text accompanying notes 21-28, supra.
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A. English Construction
Two major English cases reflect the development of common law liability
for negligence. Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., 7 relying on Ultramares,
held that an accountant could not be liable for negligent misrepresentation to
third parties not in privity. The factual pattern of the case was similar to that of
Glanzer; the defendants had been expressly told that their financial reports would
be exhibited to a prospective investor. The court admitted that the action of
the defendants had been negligent, but nevertheless held that the defendants
owed no duty to the plaintiffs.
The dissent of Lord Denning was the first thorough discussion of the scope
of accountants' liability for negligence since Ultramares. Lord Denning acknowl-
edged the danger of indeterminate liability that led to the decision in Ultramares
on the issue of negligence, but concluded that the rule that the accountant owes
a duty to no one but his client ignores the reality of the use of the accountant's
report in the modern business community. The scope of liability should be
defined by the accountant's knowledge of the intended use of the report.
[Accountants] make reports on which other people-other than their
clients-rely [on] in the ordinary course of business ... [T]hey are, in my
opinion, in proper cases, apart from any contract in the matter, under a duty
to use reasonable care in the preparation of their accounts and in the making
of their reports.
... They owe the duty..-. to any third person to whom they themselves
show the accounts, or to whom they know their employer is going to show
the accounts, so as to induce him to invest money or take some other hction
on them. But I do not think the duty can be extended still further so as to
include strangers of whom they have heard nothing and to whom their em-
ployer without their knowledge may choose to show their accounts.
... [W]here the accountants know all the time, even before they present
their accounts, that their employer requires the accounts to show a third
person so as to induce him to act on them . . . I am of opinion that the
accountants owe a duty of care to the third person48
The standard used by Lord Denning expanded the Glanzer primary bene-
ficiary rule to include a limited class of foreseen third parties. "Accountants owe
a duty of care . ..to all those whom they know will rely on their accounts in
transaction for which those accounts are prepared." 9 Denning's dissent was
subsequently adopted by the English House of Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co. v.
Hellner & Partners.5 0
Hedley Byrne involved a banker's report, rather than an accountant's report,
to a third party on the financial responsibility of one of its customers. The lan-
guage used in the case, however, refers to all persons possessed of a special skill
whom third parties rely on, when the professional person knows or could be
expected to know of the reliance being placed by the third party on the services
47 [1951] 2 K.B. 164, 1 All E.R. 426.
48 Id. at 179-81.
49 Id. at 185.
50 [1964] 2 All E.R. 575.
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performed."' The court rejected the immunity of accountants for liability to
third parties for negligence. This decision revitalized Glanzer's definition of the
scope of accountants' liability to include actually foreseen parties, and helped
lead to the subsequent reexamination of Ultramares by several American courts.
B. Reconsideration of Ultramares
Few American cases until recently have faced the issue of the scope of
accountants' liability to third parties for negligence. The cases which have done
so have addressed the issue only tangentially while focusing on liability for
fraud." Several cases which have reexamined Ultramares have reaffirmed the
view that an accountant is not liable for negligence to a third party not in
privity. 3
However, decisions may be found which challenge traditional assumptions
and ideas concerning the accountant's immunity from liability. Fischer v. Kletzs4
recognized the reality of the use of financial reports and held that the accountant
is a full participant in a business transaction in which his financial reports are
used. This view of the accountant as a full participant in the business transaction
departs from Ultramares, which treated the subsequent use of a financial report
as only collateral to the main transaction between the client and the accountant.
Recognizing the challenge to Ultramares presented in Kletz and in the
English case, Hedley Byrne, the District Court of Rhode Island in Rusch
51 The rule enunciated in Hedley Byrne would impose on accountants a duty of care
owed to persons other than those with whom the accountant is in a contractual or
fiduciary relationship. He may be liable for neglect of duty if, but only if, he knows
or ought to know what that a financial report, account or statement prepared byhim has been prepared for a specific purpose of transaction, will be shown to a par-
ticular person or class of persons, and may be relied on by that person or class of
persons in that particular connection.
Accountants' Liability to Third Parties - The Hedley Byrne Decision, 120 J. ACCOUNTANCY
66-67 (1965).
52 See, e.g., State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938); Duro
Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
53 The Florida Appellate Court in Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So.2d 291 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968), relying on State Street Trust interpretation of Ultramares, held that an
accountant was not liable for negligence to a third party, whom the accountant knew was
relying on the report. The court acknowledged that public policy argument against granting
almost total immunity to the accountants for negligence, but nevertheless decided to adhere
to the existing majority view.
The Tenth Circuit in Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th
Cir. 1971), interpreted Colorado law as granting immunity to accountants from liability for
negligence to third parties not in privity. "[A]s to third parties - even those who the account-
ant knew or should have known were relying on his audit - liability can be founded only
upon fraudulent conduct, and proof of mere negligence will not suffice." Id. at 359.
In MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973), the GeorgiaAppellate Court held that "[t]he general rule is that in the absence of intentional misrepre-
sentation cr fraud, an accountant is not liab!e for negligence to a third party who is not inprivity with the accountant." Id. at 565. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, supra note 3, at
266. The court acknowledged that increasing attack upon the policy of Ultramares by the
commentators and a number of judicial decisions, but nevertheless concluded that there was
no persuasive argument to justify a shift from the majority rule which adhered to the rationale
of Ultramares.
The majority view that an accountant will not be held liable to a third party for negli-gence when privity of contract is absent is a misinterpretation of Ultramares. By granting
almost absolute immunity to the accountant for negligence, it ignores the primary beneficiary
rule announced therein and reaffirmed in Glanzer, the nature of the accountant's role in the
transaction, and the business reality of the use of financial reports.
54 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Factors, Inc. v. Levin5 held that an accountant could be liable for a negligent
misrepresentation to a relying third party not in privity. The court, applying
Rhode Island law, seriously questioned the continuing wisdom of Ultramares,
but found it unnecessary to overrule it since it could rely on Glanzer to allow
recovery.
The court discussed the scope of duty owed to a third party by an account-
ant. "An accountant should be liable in negligence for careless financial mis-
representations relied upon by actually foreseen and limited class of persons."58
The court found that the principle of Glanzer had been effectively adopted in
the tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts" and that it was appli-
cable to accountants in determining the scope of their liability for negligence.
The reluctance of the courts to hold the accounting profession to an
obligation of care which extends to all reasonably foreseeable reliant parties
is predicated upon the social utility rationale first articulated by Judge Car-
dozo in the Ultramares case.
... [T]he wisdom of the decision in Ultramares has been doubted...
and this court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliant party be
forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional mal-
practice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread by
imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of insuring
against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the
entire consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate
the cautionary techniques of the accounting profession? For these reasons
it appears to this Court the decision in Ultramares constitutes an unwar-
ranted inroad upon the principle that "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed." Palsgraj v. Long Island R.R.58
The actually foreseen and limited class test announced in this decision is
broader than the primary beneficiary rule of Glanzer. Rusch Factors, however,
did not extend recovery to a third party who was not foreseen. The court "[left]
open for reconsideration in light of trial development, the question of whether
an accountant's liability for negligent misrepresentation ought to extend to the
full limits of foreseeability."59 The court did respond to the fact that increased
55 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
56 Id. at 93.
57 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in a
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transaction, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and guidance he
intends to supply the information, or knows that the recipient intends to supply
it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the information
to influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, or in a substantially similar
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give information extends to
loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in
any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
58 284 F. Supp. 90-91.
59 Id. at 93.
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reliance was being placed on the financial reports by the public such that the
need for greater legal responsibility of the accountant for the preparation of its
report would become necessary.
Ryan v. Kanne6 ° was the first state court decision to follow Rusch Factors.
The Iowa court found an accountant liable for negligence to a third party not
in privity.
When the accountant is aware that the balance sheet to be prepared is
to be used by a certain party or parties who will rely thereon in extending
credit or in assuming liability for obligations of the party audited, the lack
of privity should be no valid defense to a claim for damages due to the
accountant's negligence. We know of no good reason why accountants
should not accept the legal responsibility to known third parties who rea-
sonably rely upon financial statements prepared and submitted by them.6 '
The court expressly adopted the actually foreseen and member of a limited
class of person test enunciated in Rusch Factors. Again the factual pattern of
the case was analogous to Glanzer, so the court was able to avoid a direct repu-
diation of Ultramares:
It is unnecessary at this time to determine whether the rule of no liability
should be relaxed to extend to all foreseeable persons who may rely upon
the report, but we do hold it should be relaxed as to those who were actually
known to the author as prospective users of the report and take into con-
sideration the end and aim of the transaction. In other words, we believe
the position announced in the Restatement proposed draft may be accepted
to the extent that it extends the right to recover for negligence to persons
for whose benefit and guidance the accountant knows the information is
intended, especially when the party to be benefitted is identified before the
statement or report is submitted by the accountant.6 2
The court, having no need to go beyond the actually foreseen standard since the
third party was expressly known, did leave open the possibility of a duty being
owed to third parties.
Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James"' extended the liability of an
accountant beyond an actually foreseen party. The Texas Civil Appeals Court
did not limit itself to relying on Glanzer to allow recovery; rather the court
expressly adopted the Restatement position:
We find and hold that within the scope defined in Restatement, Second,
Torts, Section 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966), an accountant may be held
liable to third parties who rely upon financial statements, audits, etc., pre-
pared by the accountant in cases where the latter fails to exercise ordinary
care in the preparation of such statements, audits, etc., and the third party
because of such reliance suffers financial loss or damage. 64
60 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
61 Id. at 401.
62 Id. at 403.
63 466 S.W.2d 872 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
64 Id. at 880.
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The opinion extended accountant's liability "to all those whom he should
reasonably expect to rely on his certification of financial statements." 5  No
longer did the court limit the liability to a primary beneficiary as in Glanzer or
to an actually foreseen class as in Rusch Factors; rather liability was extended
to include any person reasonably foreseeable who would rely on the report. This
greatly increases the number of persons to whom the accountant owes a duty of
reasonable care in preparing financial reports. The actual scope of the expan-
sion, however, was not tested in the case, since the plaintiff was actually foreseen
by the accountant.
Although no intervening state court decision had passed on the issue, the
Fourth Circuit, applying Rhode Island law in Rhode Island Hospital Trust
National Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs,66 reaffirmed the holding
of Rusch Factors:
"An accountant should be liable in negligence for careless financial
misrepresentations relied upon by actually foreseen and limited class of per-
sons." Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin. 284 F. Supp. 85, 93 (D.R.I. 1968).
Since the evidence here is uncontroverted that Accountants not only knew
but acknowledged that Bank sought Borrower's financial statements in
connection with loans, that is the rule which will be applied.67
This case is also significant because of its interpretation of the disclaimer,
placed on the certification by the accountants, that they could not express an
opinion on the fairness of the financial statement. The court rejected the broad
inclusive interpretation of the disclaimer urged by the accountants. However,
the court did not establish new standards since it felt the standards adopted by
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants were sufficient to find
the disclaimer ineffective to protect the accountant from liability for negligence. 8
The court concluded that as a matter of law a general disclaimer would be
insufficient to exclude the accountant from all liability for negligence in making
a financial report to be relied upon by a foreseen party.
The Missouri Court of Appeals in Aluma Kraft Manufacturing Co. v.
Elmer Fox & Co.69 presented a coherent discussion of the policy underlying the
privity doctrine and of the need for placing greater legal responsibility on
accountants in the modern business community. Accountants must bear greater
65 Id. at 879.
66 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972).
67 Id. at 851.
68 Our conclusion with respect to the report and disclosure is reinforced by refer-
ence to industry standards of what should have been done in these circumstances.
While industry standards may not always be the maximum test of liability, certainly
they should be deemed the minimum standard by which liability should be deter-
mined. Brief references to American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, State-
ments on Auditing Procedure No. 33 (1963) are sufficient to prove the point.
Chapter 10 Para. 1 ... reads . . . "when an overall opinion can not be expressed,
the reasons therefor should be stated. . . . Para. 9 reads . .. [w]hen a qualified
opinion is intended by the independent auditor, the opinion paragraph .. . should
be modified in a way that makes clear the nature of the qualification. It should refer
specifically to the subject of the qualification and should give a clear explanation of
the reasons for the qualification and of the effect on financial position and results
of operation, if reasonably determinable."
455 F.2d at 852 '(emphasis deleted).
69 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
legal responsibility because of the increased public reliance placed on their finan-
cial reports. The opinion intepreted recent cases and the Restatement as "extend-
ing liability to third parties for whose benefit and guidance the accountant sup-
plies the information, or to such third persons, although not identified, who the
accountant knows the recipient of the audits intends to supply such infor-
mation."7 The standard which the court felt was necessary to protect the invest-
ing public from harm due to the accountant's negligence was the reasonably
foreseeable standard previously adopted in Shatterproof Glass.
The possibility of unlimited liability is a major argument against extending
the accountant's duty to third parties who rely on his reports. Aluma Kraft,
however, adopted some guidelines in determining whether liability in a particular
circumstance would be extended to the third party.
While not abandoning the doctrine of privity in all circumstances ...
the extension of limits of liability should be done on a case-to-case basis...
* * .The determination of whether in a specific case the (accountant)
will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of several factors: (1) the extent to which the trans-
action was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to
him; (3) the degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury; and (4) the
closeness of the connection between the (accountant's) conduct and the
injury suffered.7 1
Under Aluma Kraft, accountants have a duty to use reasonable care in preparing
financial reports. This result was based on the greatly increased use of, and reli-
ance upon, accountants' financial reports. The use of financial statements by
third parties was deemed not to be a collateral matter, but rather the raison
d'9tre of such reports.
Our rejection of the requirement of the strict rule of privity . . . comports
with the concepts of the functions and duties of the modem public account-
ant, the purpose of a modern audit is consistent with the development of
the liability of an accountant under the securities laws and is consistent
with the recent development in England where the doctrine of privity was
born.7 2
Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co. 73 also extended liability to a reasonably fore-
seeable party, and the accountant was not found liable. The court held that a
future investor and purchaser of stock was not a reasonably foreseeable party.
[L]ack of privity is not a defense where an accountant is aware of the
fact that his work will be relied on by a party or parties who may extend
credit to his client or assume his client's obligation. A future purchaser of
shares of stock of a corporation, however, belongs to an unlimited class of
equity holders who could not be reasonably foreseen as a third party who
would be expected to rely on a financial statement prepared by an account-
ant for the corporation. 74
70 Id. at 383.
71 Id. at 382-83.
72 Id. at 383-84.
73 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).
74 Id. at 808.
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The rationale for the distinction drawn by the court between an investor
and a creditor is not made clear, but it seemingly rests on a policy consideration
that to include the investor as a reasonably foreseeable party would leave the
accountant open to unlimited and indefinite liability. The court believed that
other factors in addition to financial reports form the basis for an investor's deci-
sion to purchase stock, while a creditor heavily relies on the reports to guide his
decision to lend money. The net result of this decision is that a future investor
must be actually known before the accountant will owe a duty of reasonable
care to him, while a creditor need only be reasonably foreseeable to be owed the
same duty.
In summary, the majority view of an accountant's common law liability
for negligence is that the accountant owes no duty to a third party not in privity
for negligence.75 Two minority trends are: (1) the accountant owes a duty of
reasonable care to an actually foreseen and limited class of third parties;"6 and
(2) the accountant owes a duty of reasonable care to all reasonably foreseeable
third parties who rely on the report."
VII. Policy Considerations
While legal precedent is helpful in defining the scope of accountants' liability,
a policy determination which is responsive to changed conditions must also be
made. Ultramares rested on a policy determination that an expansion of the
accountants' liability would be too burdensome in relationship to the benefits
derived.
However, a reexamination of the assumptions and basis for Ultramares
reveals that the decision is no longer valid, and its result is that accountants today
generally do not have legal responsibility for their professional conduct to match
their significant role in the modem business community. The accounting profes-
sion is not a new and developing profession in need of judicial protection, nor
are the standards of the profession in their formative years. Also, ownership of
stock is not confined today to a few well-informed investors. Finally, the use of
financial reports by third parties who are expected to rely on them is no longer
a collateral matter to the preparation of the report for the client.
The accountant today has a role of central responsibility in the business
community. This is recognized in the policy of full disclosure under the federal
securities laws, where the accountant is expected to provide financial information
to help guide the investing decisions of the public. Moreover, with the great in-
crease in public ownership of stock, more and mbre investors, with little knowl-
edge of the complexity of the business community, are relying on the accountant's
report. This new circumstance, not present when Ultramares was decided,
makes it clear that "between the innocent reliant party and the negligent public
accountant, the accountant should bear the burden of his negligence."7 " The
75 MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973).
76 Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
77 Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
78 Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 588, 605 (1972).
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accountant then must accept the burdens of legal responsibility that go along
with the benefits derived from his important role in the modern business com-
munity.
The chief argument asserted against increased liability for accountants
echoes the same social utility argument that won recognition in Ultramares: the
burden on the accountant outweighs any possible increase in public benefit.
The benefits to society derived from the numerous audits performed without
error outweigh the benefits to society derived from extension of liability for
the infrequent audit which may be negligent, an extension which has the
potential to financially destroy an accounting firm because of one negligent
audit.79
This status quo argument is based on the fear that a broadening of the standard
of care owned by accountants would subject them to unlimited liability, and
foreshadow the demise of the profession. However, the expansion of liability
should enhance and strengthen the accounting profession rather than destroy it.
If the courts adhere to strict rules of proof of causation, foreseeability and
reliance, the profession will not face ruin.... The sophistication of modem
audit procedures and programs and the pyramid of responsibility and review
make it highly unlikely that a "thoughtless slip or blunder," a minor mis-
take, or slight negligence, would generate catastrophic consequences. Only
when actions of the accountants are seriously out of line with the accepted
professional practices will there be a potentiality for large damages.8 0
Moreover, the accounting profession has several ways to protect itself from in-
creased liability: liability insurance, uniform accounting standards, and greater
independence in auditing. While insurance is becoming difficult to obtain and
expensive to maintain, the cost of the insurance can be effectively spread over a
large segment of the public. The accounting firm would charge the cost of such
insurance to the client, who would then allocate that cost to the consuming public
as a part of the cost of doing business.
Uniform accounting standards are another protective option available to
accountants. The present flexible standards often give courts the opportunity
to find accounting reports misleading even when generally accepted accounting
principles have been followed. By establishing uniform standards, the accounting
profession will be in a better position to set the criteria by which its action and
conduct will be judged. Acceptance of these standards by the courts as guides
to acceptable conduct would increase the prestige of the profession, the authority
of the standards themselves, and the quality of professional services.8 ' "Accep-
tance by the judiciary of accounting profession's standards as the primary criteria
in deciding the negligence issue of third party action should eventually bring
about a uniform, high degree of quality service rendered by accountants."8 2
79 Id. at 604.
80 Id. at 605-06.
81 Salmonson, CPA's Negligence, Third Party and the Future, 34 ACCOUNTING REV. 91,
95 (1959).
82 Id. at 95-96.
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Traditionally, financial statements have been the responsibility of the client,
not the accountant. "These statements are the report of management on its
stewardship of the financial entity."83 Thus, since the accountant does not con-
trol the report, it has been agreed that he should not bear the legal responsibility
for its errors. However, placing greater responsibility for reports on the account-
ant, and increasing correspondingly the independence and legal responsibility
of the accountant, would increase the reliability of the reports. By increasing the
accountants' control over the format and preparation of the reports, a fuller and
more accurate report might result. Such control would make the accountant
truly independent and, as such, a real trustee for the investing public, with the
responsibility to present a true financial picture of the client.
VIII. Conclusion
The time for reexamination and change with regard to accountants' liability
to third parties has come. Although Ultramares remains the majority rule, the
assumptions which underlie that decision are no longer valid, since the account-
ant's role in the modern business context has changed substantially from what it
was when Ultramares was decided. The accountant now plays a major role in
the business community, and a central role in the operation of the federal secu-
rities laws; yet his legal responsibility has not evolved to an equal state.
This situation has encouraged several courts to reexamine their policies
toward accountants' legal responsibility and to adopt newer standards of care
commensurate with the economic role that accountants play. Two tests have
resulted from this reexamination: the reasonably foreseeable test, and the actually
foreseen test. The latter test fails to provide sufficient protection to parties that
may be expected to rely on the accountant's report but are unknown to the
accountant when the report is prepared. While it protects larger investors and
creditors, it continues to leave the general investing public without an effective
remedy against the negligence of the accountant.
The reasonably foreseeable test, which is best reflected in the Restatement, 4
provides the best protection for relying third parties. This test recognizes the
necessary reliance placed on the accountant's report by the public. It also offers
the best opportunity for accountants to improve their professional standards for
the benefit of themselves, the business community, and the public.
83 Dawson, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law, 46
WAsH. L. REv. 675, 690 (1971).
84 See note 57, supra.
